and the continued economic disparity between the U.s. and its Latin American neighbors (Martin and Midgley, 1994; Massey et al., 1994; Smith and Edmonston, 1997) . While illegal immigration to the United States has contributed to this, much attention has been given to the provisions of current legal immigration policy, which, since 1965, has helped~ange the national origins of immigrants to become more heavily weighted toward Latin American and Asian countries. It has emphasized "family reunification" rather than II skills" in the preference structure of immigrant admissions. Together, these changes have aroused concern that the influx of new less-skilled immigrants will increase joblessness among less-educated American residents who are unable to compete for jobs in an increasingly post-industrial economy (Borjas, 1994) . There is also a concern that the increased number of poor immigrants, with school-aged children, coming from different backgrounds of language and culture, will increase the cost of government-provided social services such as education and health care (Beck, 1996) .
Although most concerns with current immigration policy seem to be associated with the costs thatthe new South-North immigration is imposing on U.s. citizens and the government, somewhat less concern is given to how current policy is affecting the social well-being of the immigrants themselves. This paper examines how the new immigration process, resulting from a policy that favors developing countries and family reunification, impacts upon the immigrants' ability to assimilate, economically and socially. It is the clustering and distancing of new immigrant groups away from the better-off, native-born residents of the country, which will inhibit the access of the former to employment and educational opportunities that ensure upward mobility. More specifically, we hypothesize that the current immigrant policy can affect the nation's settlement system, such that it increases the clustering of foreign-born immigrants, and the dispersal of longer-term residents and employment opportunities. This paper will be presented in four parts. The first part ci.tes evidence which shows that the "new" immigrants (those entering after 1965) to the U.s. are most likely to settle in areas with those of similar race and ethnic backgrounds; and that this tendency is particularly pronounced among the least skilled of these immigrants.
The second part of the paper shows the contrast and linkage between the population redistribution patterns of longer term and native-born U.S. residents on the one hand, and the destination choice patterns of the new immigrants on the other .. The internal migration patterns of domestic migrants show them selecting different metropolitan areas, and to a much greater extent than immigrants, dispersing toward smaller-sized metropolitan areas, and non-metropolitan areas. Our findings show that both 94 ASIAN AND PACIFIe MIGRATION JOURNAL economic and race-ethnic factors are important in precipitating these moves, and that the low skilled immigrants have displacement effects. on the lowskilled U.s.-born individuals, especially the non-Hispanic whites below the poverty line.
The third part of the paper examines, in more depth, the implications that these processes hold for the immigrants themselves and for the settlement system which is becoming increasingly divided into High Immigration and High Domestic Migration regions. Immigrants who arrived thirty years ago are no more likely to disperse to other parts of the country than those who arrived recently .. This is especially true for those who have lesser skills and who arrived from Latin American and Asian origins. The analysis here looks at the employment structures of the metropolitan areas in the High Immigration region which are highly bifurcated. In these areas, native-born whites occupy the most prestigious and well-paying jobs and foreign-born men and women, especially those from Latin America and Asia, occupy the least prominent and lowest-paying jobs. The implications of the settlement patterns for the poverty populations, child dependency, and elderly dependency in High Immigration regions are examined.
The paper ends with a discussion of the policy options for dealing with the less desirable direct and indirect effects of the new immigration process as well as the difficulties confronting these options.
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Immigrant Destinations and Settlement
As for most of its history, recent foreign-born immigrants to the United States tend to cluster, largely, in just a handful of metropolitan areas. Over the 1985-96 period, two-thirds of all immigrants located in just ten of the United States' 280 metropolitan areas. These areas were home to only about 30 percent of the entire U.s. population. While immigrant clustering has historical precedence, it would seem unusual in the current context of the U.S. population settlement system, which has recently displayed a general dispersal away from large port-of-entry areas such as Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Miami and Chicago (discussed below).
The "magnet" effect of these areas for foreign immigrants can be linked to the strong "family reunification" preferences associated with U.s. immigration laws since the landmark 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (Heer, 1996; Smith and Edmonston, 1997) . Before that time, immigrants to the U.S. were admitted on the basis of specific "national origins," which favored applicants from mostly European countries that populated the U.S. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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The 1965 law, and subsequent refinements, did away with nationality quotas in favor of a more open system which gave strong preference to family reunification. As a result, the sources of U.S. immigrants changed from largely European origins to countries of Latin America and Asia. This has been reinforced by the 1/ chain migration" on the part of immigrant relatives. The new immigration has also been shown to select more heavily from less-educated immigrants than the earlier waves, so that the gap between immigrants' and native-born residents' education levels has increased over time (Borjas, 1994; Smith and Edmonston, 1997) .
These new trends in foreign immigration have changed the educational and race-ethnic compositions of the U.s. immigrant population. This is evident from Table 1 , which indicates these demographic attributes for 20-34 year old immigrants who moved to the U.s. between 1985 and 1990, as reported in the 1990 U.S. Census. The strong Latin American and Asian origins of these immigrants are reflected in the fact that nearly half is of Hispanic ethnicity and more than a quarter is Asian. The combined white, black and other race categories are clearly in the minority. The lower education levels of new immigrant waves are especially apparent with the Hispanic group, among whom almost three-fifths are not high school graduates. The fact that these data are reported from the U.S. Census understates substantially the illegal immigration component, which is eveñ more heavily weighted toward populations of Hispanics, and those with less than high school education (Martin and Midgley, 1994; Smith and Edmonston, 1997) .
A combination of stronger family orientation and lower education levels are strongly related to the clustering of recent immigrant waves. New immigrants, especially those with lower skills, tend to gravitate to friends and family members who provide both social support and access to informal job networks that exist in port-of-entry areas (Massey et ai., 1994; Pedraza and Rumbaut, 1996; Portes, 1995) . This is evident in Liaw and Frey's (1998) analysis of the 20-34 year old immigrants. The authors found that three quarters of all Hispanic immigrants are located in just five states (California, New York, Florida, and Illinois) and that three-fifths of Asians are similarly clustered (California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois). Moreover, those with less than high school education are concentrated most (four-fifths of such Hispanics and almost two-thirds of such Asians are located in five states). Bartel (1989) found similar clustering in the late 1970s, based on the 1980 U.S. Census data.
To understand the importance of social ties, Frey and Liaw (1998) analyzed several state-level attributes as determinants of these immigrants' destination selections. The best model (summarized in Table 2) indicates that racial similarity -as a proxy for social and cultural ties -contributes more to the explanation than more standard economic attributes such as the state's per capita income, employment growth, unemployment rate or welfare benefits (the decrease in "Rho-square" statistic in the last column indicates the relative importance to overall explanation associated with a block of variables). Furthermore, racial similarities are especiaUy important in explaining the destination choices of blacks, Hispanics, and, to a lesser extent,Asians. Less educated immigrants, particularly Hispanics and blacks, are prone to select states with strong racial similarity.
Recent immigrants not only select familiar port-of-entry when they immigrate, but they also tend to stay in those areas or move to like areas within the United States (McHugh, 1989; Bartel and Koch, 1991; Nogle, 1997) . The continued concentration is evident from Figure 1 , which shows the percent of the total U:S. 1995 population residing in the ten High Immigration metropolitan areas separately for: the native-born population and the foreign-born populations with different years-of-arrival. The immigrants who arrived since 1965 are more likely to reside in these ten areas than the native-born population. This concentrated pattern is especially evident for Hispanics. Moreover, the foreign-born population who arrived in the 1965-85 period is no more dispersed than those who arrived since 1985. These data suggest that there is not a successive dispersal of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. since the 1965 in immigration statutes. 
\0 \0 In the past, metropolitan areas which attracted large numbers of immigrants also attracted a significant share of the nation's internal migrants from smaller sized places and from rural areas, due to the availability of jobs in these urban concentrations. In recent decades, both manufacturing and service jobs have gravitated away from the old coastal and industrial centers that still house immigrant concentrations (Frey, 1995a) . Moreover, a regional dispersal of the population from the "snowbelt" to the "sunbelt" has been underway for several decades, and a resurgence of growth of smallersized communities has led to a 1990s" rural renaissance" (Fuguitt and Beale, 1995; Johnson and Beale, 1995; Frey and Johnson, 1998) . While most of this general population dispersal is due to evolving shifts in the nation's spatial economy, an important part of it, to be discussed below, appears to result from a "push effect" of immigration.
The broad dynamics of immigration and domestic migration among the major immigrant gateways can be seen in the top panel of Table 3 . What we call the High Immigration metros include the ten metropolitan areas that attracted the most immigrants to the U.S. over the 1990-96 period. These are the same ten areas that attracted the most immigrants over the late 1980s, and in fact, for much of the post-1965 period. It is important to notice that, in all but two of these areas, net domestic migration (or net internal migration within the United States) is negative. In fact, each of the largest immigration magnets, Los Angeles and New York, lost over 1.3 million domestic migrants each over the first six years of the 1990s.
By the same token, when one looks at the ten metropolitan areas that gained the most domestic migrants over the same period (lower panel of Table 3 ), one finds that immigration only makes a small contribution to the overall migration gains. Does this mean thatthere is a necessary relationship between immigration and domestic out-migration? Not generally, because the size of each migration component is based on different kinds of motivations. In the case of immigrants, the attraction of friends, family and a dense network of social and economic support anchors them to the High Immigration metropolitan areas. Native-born domestic migrants are much more attuned to the "pushes" and "pulls" of the national job market (Long, 1988; Gober, 1993) and they have less constraint in their choices than the new immigrant groups.
Indeed, while the High Immigration metros tend to retain their role irrespective of economic cycles, the High Domestic Migration metros change from period to period. For example, during the late 1980s, western metropolitan areas such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, Portland, and Austin were r--~-somewhat lower in their ability to attract domestic migrants due to less vigorous economies (Frey, 1996) . In fact, the Denver metropolitan area lost domestic migrants over the 1985-1990 period due to a severe downturn in the extractive-related industry that befell the larger region. It is also possible that there are periods when several of the High Immigration metros also attract domestic migrants due to an economic resurgence. This tended to be the case with most Texas metropolitan areas during the 1990s, including Dallas and Houston, which gained from both immigration and domestic migration over the period. The poinfis that while immigrants tend to gravitate to a selected few gateway metropolitan areas, domestic migrants are more "footloose." For the recent decades, they have dispersed away from the major immigrant magnets. This is also true with respect to their shifts towards smaller sized metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan territory. Over the 1990-96 period, the ten High Immigration metros collectively lost over 3.6 million domestic migrants at the same time that all other metropolitan areas gained 2 million and non-metropolitan areas gained 1.5 million domestic migrants. Comparable rates of immigration and domestic migration for these areas are depicted in the upper panel of Figure 3 .
The fact that High Immigration metros are achieving most of their population gains from immigration and fertility, increasingly from their foreign born populations -while at the same time losing domestic migrants -affects their demographic compositions with respect to race-ethnicity, age structure, and other demographic variables. Figure 2 portrays the raceethnic structure of immigration and net domestic migration for selected High Immigration metros and selected High Domestic Migration metros over the 1985-90 period. It is apparent that immigrant flows to New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles are dominated by new immigrant minorities (Hispanics and Asians). At the same time, they are losing domestic migrants that are largely white, or white and black. In contrast to these, Tampa, Phoenix, and Las Vegas are being mfused by predomipantly white domestic migrant inflows, and Atlanta is gaining whites and blacks through domestic migration.
The overall impact on how these migration flows affect population compositions can already be seen when one examines current race-ethnic compositions of these areas (see 1994 race-ethnic attributes on the right-hand side of Table 3 ). Already, the Los Angeles metropolitan area is a "minority majority" area where the past white "majority" represents only 46 percent of the total population. The strong presence of Hispanic or Asian populations is evident for most of the ten High Immigration metropolitan areas, with Boston and Washington, D.C. being the exceptions. In contrast, most of the High Domestic Migration metros are largely white, or white and black, in their racial compositions.
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The encapsulation of the new ethnic minorities within the ten High Immigration metro areas is also evident from the comparison of 1980 with 196 race-ethnic compositions shown in the lower portion of Figure 3 . While the white percentage of these areas, in the aggregate, becomes reduced from 69 percent to 58 percent, other broad categories of areas remain approximately four-fifths white in 1996. Clearly, the new immigrant minorities are becoming more concentrated and isolated within specific metropolitan regions.
Although the redistribution patterns of domestic migrants occur somewhat independently of the more concentrated, settled patterns of immigrants, there was one significant group of domestic out-migrants which appears to be affected by the new immigrants. These are native-born or longer-term residents with no more than a high school education and with relatively low incomes. Our own research has shown that this category of residents is most likely to show a net out-migration in the areas with high levels of immigration, when other standard migration determinants are taken into account (Frey, 1995b (Frey, , 1995c . This finding is consistent with similar kinds of studies undertaken in the late 1970s and during the '980s (Filer, 1992; Walker et aI., 1992; White and Hunter, 1993; White and Imai, 1994) , although Wrigh t et aI., (1997) show inconsistent results, depending on the specification.
The data in Table 4 provide an overview of the nature of these outmigration patterns among working-aged residents (ages 25-64) of six High Immigration metro areas over the 1985-90 period. In each of these areas, the selective out-migration of native-born domestic migrants shows highest rates for those with less than college degrees, and in most cases, outmigration is most pronounced for those with less than high school education. This accentuated out-migration of the least educated is unique and stands in contrast with more" normal" long distance migration which tends to select on the most educated segments of a population (Long, 1988; Gober, 1993) . Our broader analysis (Frey, 1995b) shows that this unique kind of outmigration tends to be confiiled to High Immigration metro areas.
One clue as to why this effect is occurring can be gained by examining the ra tes of immigration, by education category, in the third column of Table  4 . The extremely high rates of immigration from abroad among those with less than a high school education pose strong competition for employment prospects for native-born persons with similar skill levels. As indicated earlier, the latter residents are not constrained to reside in these highimmigration areas, and may be responding to job competition. It should also be noticed that college graduates in four of the six metropolitan areas show a net in-migration. The competition from foreign immigrants for jobs that they qualify for is less severe.
The independent effect that low-skilled immigration (expressed as a rate) exerts on net domestic migration for persons at different education ... ,.\< .... •.
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•. Significant at p<.05
•. levels can be evaluated from the multivariate analyses shown in Table 5 . Here, separate regression analyses are presented, where the dependent variable, in each, represents the net domestic migration among 25-34 year olds at a given education level (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate). Among the independent variables are standard state-level economic determinants (income per capita, manufacturing growth, service, unemployment rate), climatic variables (coldness, hotness), controls for growing regions of the U.S. (South Atlantic Region, Mountain Region) and a control for the population size of the state. The results indicate that the Low Education Immigration Rate exerts a significant and negative impact on domestic migrants with at most high school education. It is noteworthy that college graduates are attracted to areas with high immigration of low-skilled residents, reflecting, perhaps, the complementarity of activities associated with these immigrants on the one hand, and industries that employ college graduates, on the other (see Waldinger, 1989) . College graduates are also the only group to respond negatively to severely hot or cold temperatures.
More refined migration modeling has shown that the net out-migration of these less-skilled domestic migrants is largely a result of immigration's effect on the domestic migrant departure from an areas, rather than in the form of a "reduced pull" (Liaw and Frey, 1996; Frey et al., 1996) . A simulation based on this more rigorous modeling (Liaw and Frey, 1996) permits an analysis of how reduced U.5. immigration levels might affect domestic net migration in persons with at most high school education, in selected High Immigration states. Figure 4 shows that, in California, a 50 percent decrease in immigration would reverse the outflow of low-skilled working aged residents. The net out-migration of -59,000 persons with high school education or less would become a gain of +44,000 under a reduced immigration scenario. On the other hand, if immigration were doubled, net outmigration would increase to -249,000. Similar kinds of findings are shown for New York, Texas, and Illinois. Moreover, Figure 5 indicates that a.50 percent reduction in California's immigration would eliminate a significant net out-migration of its poverty population, and substantially reduce the even greater net out-migration of its poverty population, and substantially reduce the even greater nef out-migration of its white poverty population. (These represent poverty populations of persons with at most high school education). In short, halving the immigration level would dramatically reduced the "demographic displacement" of less-educated, lower-income residents by immigrants within California and other High Immigration states.
Although we have attributed the immigrant effects on the domestic outmigration of low skilled residents to be associated with labor force competition, a variety of other social and economic factors may be at work. For example, there is a perception, warranted or not, on the part of many residents of High Immigration areas that immigrants increase a variety of social and economic costs (e.g., higher crime rates, reduced services) that are increasingly absorbed by lower-income residents (Martin, 1995; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993) . Race and ethnic prejudice can also come into play among longer term residents who are reacting to new comers~ith unfamiliar backgrounds, thus prompting a new form of "white flight" -reminiscent of the city-to-suburb movement of urban whites in the 1950's and 1960's (Massey and Denton, 1993) .
Impacts of the Immigration Process on Immigrants and Settlement Patterns
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The concentrated settlement of recent South-North immigrants to the U.S., largely from Latin America and Asian origins, has placed them in metropolitan areas and labor markets that are no longer major destinations of domestic migrants. The larger of these areas are taking the forms of "dual
.."
..-.
•.. economies" -that is, as new waves of relatively low-skilled immigrants arrive, they perform functions that complement professional and white collar activity associated with corporate headquarters, advanced services, and knowledge-based industries. Hence, it is not unusual to see an influx of low-skilled immigrants, an outflow of native-born low and middle class whites, and an inflow of well-educated professionals. These transitions are apparent for the Los Angeles metropolitan area over the 1985-90 period, as shown in Table 6 . The social and economic impacts that these evolving "dual economy" immigrant gateway areas hold for new immigrants, especially those in less assimilated groups and with low skills, have been written about by American social scientists (Portes,1995; Sassen,1996; Waldinger,1989 Waldinger, ,1996 . The immigrants who are attracted to these areas via their ethnic connections to economic enclaves and occupation niches which allow them to survive, benefit from social capital, and bide their time in hope that they, or their children, can achieve further upward mobility and assimilation. Unfortunately, economic globalization has resulted in a massive and permanent loss of low-skilled and high-paying jobs (e.g., those in steel making and automobile assembly) that used to provide a ladder to the old-wave immigrants to climb to the middle class. Without this ladder, most of the new immigrants are likely to be trapped in the bottom of the economic strata, except for the small proportion with college education. The access to the appropriate skills and credentials for the better jobs may lie beyond the reach of large numbers of new ethnic immigrants and their children who reside in poorer, ethnically segregated communities.
Mid-1990s statistics for Los Angeles and the aggregated ten High Immigration metropolitan areas underline the predicament (see Table 7 ). In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the foreign-born population represents 38 percent of adults aged 18 and above. However, they represent half of those who have less than high school education and blue collar and service jobs, and three-fifths of those who are in the bottom quartile of family income. In contrast, only about one-fifth of L.A.' s college graduates, managers and professionals, and higher income persons are represented by the foreign-born. The disparity is somewhat less severe but still quite apparent among the combined High Immigration metropolitan areas where the foreign-born represent about 27 percent of the population. Still, in terms of economic circumstance and potentials, a sharp gap now exists between the foreign-born and native-born in these emerging" dual economy" areas. The right-hand side of Table 7 makes a similar comparison focusing on minorities (largely Hispanics, in the case of Los Angeles) and the barriers that need to be overcome. -136,158 -38,108 -53,232 -57,220 31,550 3,978 -17,840 -32,825 -32,547 
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Communities that house large numbers of immigrants will also bear a special burden with respect to other selected populations, such as poor children. Table 8 indicates the magnitude of change that immigration brings to the population of poor' children in High Immigration states such as California, New York and Texas, in contrast to states which are gaining poor children, largely, from domestic migration (e.g., Washington, Wisconsin, North Carolina). The former states, in fact, show a demographic displacement of poor children, much like they do for the less-educated workingaged population, shown above.
Since California's demographic displacement of immigrant poor children for the native-born shows a greater infusion of Hispanics and Asians compared with out-migrating whites and blacks, California has an increase in poor children, especially those who have greater difficulties with English language. However, many more of the new poor immigrant children live in married couple families, in sharp contrast to out-migrating children who are more likely to live in single parent families. This suggests that social support agencies should not only deal with larger numbers of poor children in High Immigration areas, but also cater to their particular needs associated with assimilation and bilingual education.
New immigrant minorities, Hispanics and Asians, more so than whites, will bear the burden of child dependency rather than elderly dependency. This is apparent from the demographic projections for these different groups, nationwide, over the period 1995-2025 ( Figure 6 ). Hispanics, Asians and blacks show higher levels of child dependency than whites over the entire projection period. These groups also show lower levels of elderly dependency. The "younger" age structures of Hispanics and Asians, in particular, are a consequence of the continued influx of immigrants, projected over this period. The lower child dependency of whites is due to their "older" age structure as well as their lower fertility. Moreover, the aging of the baby boom cohorts, beginning in the years 2012, explain why the elderly dependency ratio of the white population rises sharply and overtakes the child dependency ratio toward the end of this projection period.
What this means in High Immigration states such as California is that many more resources will need to be preserved for the special needs of younger Hispanic and Asian children in contrast to other parts of the United States. This is illustrated in Figure 7 which shows the projected racial compositions of broad age groups in the year 2025. (These projections were derived from U.s. Census Bureau projections conducted in October 1996, which assumed relatively consistent patterns of immigration and domestic migration across states by race-ethnic groups, age, and gender). They show that California's child population will be over one-half Hispariic, one-sixth Asian, and only one-quarter white. This contrasts with the nation's child The fact that working-aged (18-64) population in California is also largely Hispanic and Asian suggests that there may be more political support from California's future voters for service and medical programs catering to the child popula tion than those catering to the elderly population in which Hispanics and Asians will still constitute the minority. Again, this contrasts with the nationwide situation where much concern will be given to the largely white elderly, belonging to the large baby boom cohorts. The , , , "~I • " dependency burdens for this group will be, mostly, borne by the largely white working-aged population. Hence, the concentrated effects of immigration will shape the child dependency and elderly needs and political coalition somewhat differently in High Immigration regions than in other parts of the U.s.
The increasing spatial segregation by race and ethnicity of the U.S. population are symptomafic of other demographic differences that will emerge across the states with respect to their age structures, class structures, multi-cultural life styles, political behavior, and so forth. Figure 8 shows that 12 states will have non-white populations exceeding 40 percent in the year 2025. These include states that lie in the High Immigration regions where Hispanics or Asians represent a significant part of the non-white population. At the other extreme are 13 states where more than 85 percent of the population will still be white, and the remainder of the states will be somewhere in between. What is clear is that the high concentration of immigrants and immigrant minorities will still continue, according to these projections. We have referred to this scenario as a "demographic balkanization" (Frey, 1995b (Frey, , 1996 Liaw and Frey, 1998) .
Policy Options
We have shown that the concentrated destination choices and settlement patterns of the new immigrants to the U.S. shape the demographic structures of High Immigration regions quite differently from the rest of the country. The High Immigration regions will become increasingly multiethnic, have younger age structures, and different social and economic concerns than other parts of the country.
An important aspect of this continued immigrant concentration is the emergence of dual economies in these High Immigration regions, wherein new immigrants continue to cluster not only residentially but economically in industry and occupational niches that may hold little prospect for advancement. The fact that U.s. legal immigration, as well as illegal immigration flows, tends to be comprised, to a large degree, by young adults with skill levels that lie below much of the native-born population serves to exacerbate this concentration.
While it might be argued that the evolution of such dual-economy "world cities" is an inevitable development in the emerging world economy where transnational movements will become more common, the issue of immigrant advancement and the lack of appropriate opportunity structures is one that is important to address. The "ladders" for advancement from entry-level jobs to more well-paying, secure positions -available to earlier waves of immigrants from Europe to the U.s. • ingly, skill credentials, post-high school and college education are necessary to advance into those positions. The continued concentrations of lowerskilled immigrants into selected labor markets and regions place strong pressures on publicly-funded school systems to provide programs (including bilingual education) that will necessary to prepare new waves of immigrants and their children. Policy options that might intervene would seem to fall into two categories: (1) policies that reduce .the entry oflow-skilled immigrants; (2) policies that provide more federal support to the education and economic assimilation of new immigrant waves. Unfortunately, neither of these options has been politically viable in the United States in the recent past.
The restriction on the entry of low-skilled immigrants, while called for by some advocates, is difficult to implement for several reasons. First, the family reunification provision, which has been linked to the arrival oflowerskilled immigrants, lies at the heart of the American immigration tradition. Second, the long border with Mexico, where many low-skilled immigrants originate, is difficult to close off. Third, by causing the phenomenon of "brain drain" in the source countries, such a policy is likely to induce a strong criticism from the governments of other countries. Fourth, the employers whose business profits are derived from the use of low-wage labor are unlikely to support such a policy. Fifth, a recent National Academy of Sciences study (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) indicates that, on balance, U.S. residents have benefited from the recent immigration ii1 its current form. Hence, while there may be some modest modifications to U.S. immigration policy, a coalition of interest groups including employers and co-ethnic family members from immigrant origin counties, may have sufficient political influence to forestall drastic changes in the nature of current policy -including severe restrictions on the number of legal immigrants with low skills, or more substantial enforcement efforts toward reducing illegal immigration.
The second policy option which would help new waves of immigrants and their children assimilate economically into middle class jobs, and assimilate geographically away from highly concentrated areas would require the federal government support to back up local and state-level educational programs. However, the current political climate in the U.S. is not favorable to this policy option. In fact, recent changes in the government's welfare program, and other kinds of social services, have favored the defederalization of resources and administration of such programs. Moreover, within the United States, primary and secondary level public education has remained largely the domain oflocal governments rather than state of federal institutions. Unfortunately, for the new immigrant waves, the public revenues that they generate are largely accrued at the federal level (via income tax payments and other sources), and their costs are mostly borne at the local level (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) . Hence, local communities that receive large numbers of recent immigrants are probably in the worst positions to improve the quality of education and specially tailor to their upward mobility.
The above characterization of the current political climate toward immigration policy, and local support for social and educational services toward immigrants, reflects the V.S. situation in the mid-1990s. The continued clustering of new immigrant waves in High Immigration metropolitan areas and regions will eventually put pressure on different levels of government to look to one or both of these policies for solution. The concentrated settlement of immigrants represents not only new opportunities but also longer-term constraints for many of the less well-educated immigrants who have recently arrived in the V.S. This clustering is linked to immigrants' lower education levels, the restricted employment opportunities available to them, and the importance of kinship or family networks in the concentrated immigrant regions of the country. The future economic and geographic dispersal of large numbers of these immigrants represents an important challenge to policy makers in the decade ahead.
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